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EXPLAINING CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE SCALE 
OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
OF 41 LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate critically the competing explanations for the cross-
national variations in the scale of informal employment which variously correlate higher 
levels of informal employment with economic under-GHYHORSPHQW µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶
theory), corruption, KLJKHU WD[HV DQG VWDWH LQWHUIHUHQFH µQHR-OLEHUDO¶ WKHory) and 
LQDGHTXDWHVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQWRSURWHFWZRUNHUVIURPSRYHUW\µstructuralist¶WKeory). 
Methodology 
To do this, data on the prevalence of informal employment collected by the International 
Labour Organisation using a common survey method across 41 less developed economies 
is analysed and compared using bivariate regressions with World Bank development 
indicators. 
Findings 
Some 34.4 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce is in informal employment across 
these 41 countries, with the share in informal employment ranging from 83.6 per cent in 
India to 6.1 per cent in Serbia. Evaluating critically the competing explanations, a call is 
made for a synthesis of the modernisation and structuralist theoretical perspectives in a 
new µQHR-modernisatiRQ¶ theory that tentatively associates higher levels of informal 
employment with economic under-development, smaller government and inadequate state 
intervention to protect workers from poverty. 
Research limitations 
Based on 41 cases, a multivariate regression analysis was not possible to determine how 
important each characteristic is to the final outcome whilst controlling for the other 
characteristics.  
Practical implications 
This paper tentatively displays that wider economic and social policies, such as social 
protection, are significantly correlated with the level of informal employment.  
Originality/value 
This is the first paper to use a direct survey to analyse and explain cross-national 
variations in informal employment in less developed economies. 
 
Keywords: informal economy; shadow economy; underground sector; emerging 
economies; development economics; economic development. 
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Introduction 
From the middle of the twentieth century, a view predominated that the informal 
economy was purely a developing country phenomenon and represented a pre-modern 
mode of production that was steadily disappearing with the advent of modernisation and 
economic development (Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 1959). Since the turn of the 
new millennium however, there has been growing recognition that informal employment 
prevails in developed as well as developing economies and is growing in many global 
regions (Slavnic, 2010; Webb et al., 2009; Williams and Lansky, 2013). Indeed, in many 
developing countries, the majority of non-agricultural workers are in informal 
employment (ILO, 2013; Dibben and Williams, 2012). The result is that there is a need 
for scholarship on human resources and labour economics to broaden its scope beyond 
formal employment to explaining the scale of informal employment (e.g., Darwish and 
Singh, 2013; Lopez and Teixeira, 2013). In this paper, the aim is to contribute to the 
advancement of knowledge on this expanded view of human resources and labour 
economics by evaluating critically the competing explanations for the cross-national 
variations in the scale of informal employment across less developed economies.  
To do this, the first section will briefly review how informal employment has 
been defined and measured along with how the cross-national variations in the scale of 
informal employment have been variously explained to result from either economic 
under-development (modernisation theory), corruption, high taxes and state interference 
(neo-liberal theory) or inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty 
(structuralist theory). Revealing that there has been little attempt to evaluate critically 
these competing explanations in relation to the variations in the scale of informal 
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employment across less developed economies, this paper seeks to fill that gap. To do so, 
the second section will introduce the database, namely the International Labour 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶V ,/2 FRXQWU\ VXUveys on informal employment which covers 41 less 
developed economies, along with the development indicators here used to evaluate 
critically the validity of the rival explanations for the cross-national variations in the level 
of informal employment. The third section then reports the descriptive results on the 
varying share of all non-agricultural jobs that are in informal employment across these 41 
less developed economies followed in the fourth section by a preliminary analysis of the 
validity of the competing explanations for the varying prevalence of informal 
employment across less developed economies (albeit only using bivariate correlations 
rather than multivariate regression analysis due to only 41 cases being available). The 
fifth and final section draws some conclusions by summarising the findings about the 
share of non-agricultural jobs in informal employment and how this varies cross-
nationally, and tentatively calls for a synthesis of existing theories in the form of a new 
µQHR-PRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶theory. 
 
Informal employment: definitions, measurements and explanations 
Defining informal employment 
This paper adheres to the widely agreed definition of informal employment developed by 
the International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) (Hussmans, 2005; ILO, 2011, 
2012). Informality can be defined using either enterprises or jobs as the unit of 
observation. As Table 1 displays, if enterprises are the unit used, then the result is to 
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GHILQHLQIRUPDOLW\LQ WHUPVRIµHPSOR\PHQW LQ WKHLQIRUPDOVHFWRU¶$%ZKLOVWLI MREV
DUHXVHGLQIRUPDOLW\LVGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIµLQIRUPDOHPSOR\PHQW¶$& 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Here, those in informal employment (A+C), akin to the 17th ICLS in 2003, are defined as 
those persons whose main jobs lack basic social or legal protections or employment 
benefits and may be found in the formal sector, informal sector or households. Persons in 
informal employment include: (a) own-account workers self-employed in their own 
informal sector enterprises; (b) employers self-employed in their own informal sector 
enterprises; (c) contributing family workers; (d PHPEHUV RI LQIRUPDO SURGXFHUV¶
cooperatives; (e) employees with informal jobs in formal sector enterprises, informal 
sector enterprises, or as paid domestic workers employed by households; (f) own-account 
workers engaged in self-provisioning, if considered employed in the sense that the 
production makes an important contribution to household consumption (ILO, 2012, 
2013). With regard to (e) above, an employee is defined as in informally employment if 
the employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national labour 
legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment 
benefits (e.g., notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or sick leave) (ILO, 2012; 
2013). 
This definition thus enables informal employment in informal sector enterprises 
(A) to be distinguished from formal jobs in informal sector enterprises (B) as well as 
informal employment in formal sector enterprises (C). Informal enterprises are defined by 
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the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993 as private 
unincorporated enterprises which are unregistered or small in terms of the number of 
employed persons. An unincorporated enterprise is a production unit that is not 
constituted as a separate legal entity independently of the individual (or group of 
individuals) who owns it, and for which no complete set of accounts is kept. An 
enterprise is unregistered, meanwhile, if it is not registered under specific forms of 
QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLRQ HJ IDFWRULHV¶ RU FRPPHUFLDO DFWV WD[ RU VRFLDO VHFXULW\ ODZV
professional groups' regulatory acts). Holding a trade license or business permit under 
local regulations does not qualify as registration. An enterprise is small, meanwhile, if its 
size in terms of employment levels is below a specific threshold (e.g. five employees) 
determined according to national circumstances (Hussmans, 2005; ILO, 2011, 2012).  
 
Measuring the level of informal employment 
In a developing world context, it is often difficult to compare cross-national variations in 
the level of formal employment due to the lack of national-level formal labour market 
data. Analysing cross-national variations in the level of informal employment, which is 
by definition hidden from view, is therefore even more problematic. To overcome this, 
two options are available. Estimates of the cross-national variations in the level of 
informal employment can be produced using direct surveys of the level of informal 
employment and/or indirect measurement methods that use proxy indicators of informal 
employment or seek statistical traces of informal employment in macroeconomic data 
collected for other purposes (OECD, 2002, 2012; Ram and Williams, 2008).  
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These indirect methods for measuring cross-national variations can be divided 
into four broad techniques: those using individual non-monetary proxy indicators such as 
the number of very small enterprises (ILO, 2002) or electricity demand (e.g., Friedman et 
al, 2000; Lacko, 1999); those employing individual monetary proxy indicators such as the 
level of cash deposits (Gutmann, 1977) or money transactions (Feige, 2012;  Frey and 
Weck, 1983), income/expenditure discrepancies (Paglin, 1994) and those using multiple 
indirect proxy indicators (e.g., Schneider, 2013; Schneider and Williams, 2013). The 
problem with all of these methods in a developing world context is that the data is often 
not available on these proxy indicators. 
Direct surveys, meanwhile, can either take the form of quantitative, qualitative or 
mixed methods surveys. On the whole, the use of direct surveys to evaluate cross-national 
variations has taken the form of quantitative surveys. Examples include a three-country 
comparison of European nations (Pedersen, 2003) and a 2007 Eurobarometer survey of 
informal employment in the 27 member states of the European Union (Williams, 2013). 
Until now, direct survey methods have not been used to evaluate and explain cross-
national variations in the level of informal employment in the developing world, despite 
the ready availability of a dataset of 41 countries where the International Labour 
Organisation has conducted surveys of the scale of informal employment (ILO, 2011, 
2012). Here, therefore, it is this dataset which will be analysed to calculate the cross-
national variations in the level of informal employment.   
Before doing so however, it is necessary to outline how the cross-national 
variations in the scale of informal employment have been so far explained since the 
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intention in this paper is to evaluate critically these competing explanations in less 
developed economies. 
    
Explaining cross-national variations in the level of informal employment 
Until now, three competing perspectives have sought to explain the cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment. These view higher levels of informal 
employment to be a result of either economic under-development (modernisation 
explanation), high taxes, public sector corruption and state interference in the free market 
(neo-liberal explanation) or inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty 
(structuralist perspective). Each is here considered in turn. 
Modernisation explanation. During the twentieth century, informal employment was 
widely represented as a legacy of a pre-modern mode of production and viewed as fading 
from view as the modern formal economy became ever more hegemonic. Informal 
employment was therefore commonly portrayed as a residue from an earlier mode of 
production and disappearing. Viewed in this manner, those developing world countries in 
which informal employment is extensive are seen as portraying the characteristics of 
³under-development´ and even ³backwardness´ whilst extensive formal sectors are 
viewed as representing ³advancement´ and ³development´ (Geertz, 1963; Gilbert, 1998; 
Lewis, 1959). The result is that informal employment is represented as an expression of 
under-development LQ WKHQRUPDWLYH VHQVHRI D ODFNRI ³SURJUHVV´ that will disappear 
with economic advancement and modernisation. Applying this to explaining the cross-
national variations in the extent of informal employment, it can be suggested that in less 
developed economies, there will be a higher prevalence of informal employment. To 
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explore its validity, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): informal employment will be more prevalent in less developed 
economies. 
 
Neo-liberal explanation. Over the past few decades, nevertheless, not least due to the 
persistence and even expansion of informal employment globally, a range of competing 
explanations have emerged. For neo-liberal commentators, high levels of informal 
employment are a product of high taxes, a corrupt public sector and too much state 
interference in the workings of the free market. Informal employment is therefore a 
rational economic decision which people and businesses pursue in order to voluntarily 
exit the formal economy so as to avoid the costs, time and effort associated with formal 
employment (e.g., Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004; 
Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984). As Becker (2004, p. 10) asserts, ³informal work 
arrangements are a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by 
government bureaucracies´. For such neo-liberal commentators, therefore, informal 
employment is a rational economic strategy pursued by those stifled by high taxes and 
state-imposed institutional constraints (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007). 
The ongoing prevalence and even growth of informal employment is consequently a 
product of high taxes, public sector corruption, over-regulation and state interference in 
the free market and the resultant remedy is seen to be to pursue tax reductions, reduce 
corruption, deregulation and minimal state intervention. From this neo-liberal 
perspective, therefore, informal employment will be higher in countries with higher taxes, 
public sector corruption and state interference in the workings of the free market. To 
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explore the validity of this neo-liberal explanation, the following hypothesis can be 
tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): informal employment will be more prevalent in less developed 
countries with higher tax rates, greater public sector corruption and higher levels of 
state interference in the free market. 
 
Structuralist explanation. For structuralist scholars in contrast, the widespread existence 
and even expansion of informal employment in economies is represented as a direct by-
product of the emergence of a de-regulated open world economy (Castells and Portes, 
1989; Gallin, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Slavnic, 2010). The on-going functional integration of 
a unified global economic system is resulting in subcontracting and outsourcing 
becoming a key vehicle for integrating informal employment into contemporary 
capitalism, resulting in further downward pressure on wages and the erosion of incomes 
and welfare provision, and the growth of yet more informal employment. As Fernandez-
Kelly (2006: 18) states, ³the informal economy is far from a vestige of earlier stages in 
economic development. Instead, informality is part and parcel of the processes of 
modernization´. Indeed, for Davis (2006: 186), such ³SULPLWLYHIRUPVRIH[SORLWDWLRQ«
have been given new life by postmodern globalization´.  
From this structuralist perspective, in consequence, informal employment is a 
largely unregulated realm composed of low-paid and insecure work carried out under 
³sweatshop-like´ conditions as a survival tactic by marginalised populations excluded 
from employment in the formal economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 
2001). Informal employment is therefore necessity-driven, and participants forced into 
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this realm by their inability to find formal employment (e.g., Castells and Portes, 1989; 
Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2002). In the new post-Fordist and post-socialist era, those engaged in 
informal employment are unwilling pawns cast into this sphere as a survival mechanism. 
To evaluate the validity of this structuralist explanation, the following hypothesis can be 
tested: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): informal employment will be more prevalent in those less 
developed countries with lower levels of state intervention to protect workers from 
poverty. 
 
Evaluations of the competing explanations. Most commentators explaining the cross-
national variations in the scale of informal employment have done so by adopting one of 
WKHVHµORJLFV¶)RUH[DPSOHWKH,/2DGRSWWKHPRGHUQLVDWLRQSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWWKH
preponderance of informal employment decreases as GDP per capita grows, whilst 
Schneider and Williams (2013) has largely sought to display the validity of various tenets 
of the neo-liberal perspective such as the need to reduce taxes and the level of public 
sector corruption so as to decrease the scale of informal employment. 
Few scholars have evaluated critically the competing theories. When they have 
done so, however, the finding has been that no one perspective is universally valid. It has 
been contended, for example, that structuralist explanations are more valid with regard to 
informal waged work and the neo-liberal perspective more valid when explaining 
informal self-employment (Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams et al., 2013), or that the 
structuralist explanation is valid when explaining informal employment in relatively 
deprived populations but the neo-liberal perspective when explaining informality in 
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relatively affluent populations (Evans et al., 2006; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Williams, 2004; 
Williams and Windebank, 2006). Studies have similarly argued that the structuralist 
H[SODQDWLRQ LV PRUH YDOLG ZKHQ H[SODLQLQJ ZRPHQ¶V QHFHVVLW\-driven informal 
employment and the neo-liberal explanation to the voluntary exit rationales that 
FKDUDFWHULVHPHQ¶V HQJDJHPHQW )UDQFN, 2012; Grant, 2013; Williams, 2011). The only 
study that has evaluated critically the competing theories as explanations for cross-
national variations in the scale of informal employment has focused upon the member 
states of the European Union and finds evidence to support the tenets of both the 
modernisation and structuralist perspectives but little evidence to support most of the 
tenets of the neo-liberal perspective (Williams, 2013).  
Until now, however, no studies so far as is known have evaluated critically the 
validity of these perspectives when explaining the cross-national variations in the level of 
informal employment across less developed economies. It is to filling this gap that 
attention now turns.  
 
Methodology: examining cross-national variations in the level of informal 
employment 
To estimate the variations in the level of informal employment across less developed 
economies, the ILO surveys of informal employment conducted in 41 countries are here 
analysed. The main advantage of using these surveys is that they use the same common 
broad definition of informal employment as discussed above and also employ a very 
similar survey methodology when collecting data on the extent of informal employment 
using either an ILO Department of Statistics questionnaire sent to countries or 
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information from national labour force or informal sector surveys (for further details, see 
ILO, 2012). 
Although the ILO (2012) provides brief statistical portraits of the size of informal 
employment, this paper will focus for the first time on how and why this varies cross-
nationally and across global regions. It is important to state at the outset, nevertheless, 
that the findings reported here relate solely to non-agricultural employment. The ILO 
survey does not analyse employment in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. If it 
was included, the level of informal employment would be doubtless much higher. 
Analysing the quality of the data collected using this survey method so far as the 
prevalence of informal employment is concerned, it is unknown whether the current 
dataset provides an accurate description of the level of informal employment. This is 
because there is no benchmark available for evaluating this. It is sometimes stated in 
developed economies that such direct surveys under-estimate the scale of informal 
employment relative to indirect measurement methods (Eurofound, 2013; OECD, 2012). 
This is similarly the case in developing countries (see Bardasi et al, 2010), particularly in 
UHODWLRQWRZRPHQ¶VLQIRUPDOZRUN)UDQFNDQG2OVVRQ/DQJVWEDQG6DOHQ
If anything, therefore,, the prevalence of informal employment might be higher than 
suggested by this survey. Moreover, people in different countries may well have differing 
tendencies to report or not report their informal work due to variations in whether this is 
deemed acceptable in terms of national norms, values and codes of conduct. Although 
this possibility cannot be ruled out, by adopting the same definition of informal 
employment and the same survey method and interview schedule for collecting the data, 
the survey reported here has sought to minimise the effects of such tendencies on the 
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findings. As such, although some caution must be exercised with regard to this data set 
due to such caveats, the country-level data reported in this paper is here deemed 
sufficiently comparable between countries to allow comparative analysis. It is also 
important to note that throughout this paper ³employment´ refers to what participants 
self-report as their main job if the person has more than one job.  
To analyse the wider economic and social characteristics that each theoretical 
perspective associates with higher levels of informal employment, meanwhile, indicators 
have been used from the World Bank database of development indicators for the year in 
which the survey of informal employment was conducted in each country (World Bank, 
2013). The only indicators taken from a non-official sources are on perceptions of public 
VHFWRU FRUUXSWLRQ ZKLFK KDV EHHQ WDNHQ IURP 7UDQVSDUHQF\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V FRUUXSWLRQ
perceptions index for the relevant year in each country (Transparency International, 
2013) DQG WKH 6RFLDO 3URJUHVV ,QGH[ DV D PHDVXUH RI µGHYHORSPHQW¶ 6RFLDO 3URJUHVV
Imperative, 2014).  
To evaluate the validity of the modernisation explanation that the level of 
development relates to the level of informality, the conventional indicator used in 
previous studies is GNP per capita (ILO, 2012; Yamada, 1996), although there is 
widespread criticism of this indicator as a proxy measure of the µGHYHORSPHQW¶ of an 
economy or the standard of living of its citizens (Kuznets, 1962). Here, therefore, both 
this and additional PHDVXUHPHQWVRIWKHOHYHORIµGHYHORSPHQW¶DUHXVHG, namely: 
x GNP per capita; 
x household final consumption expenditure per capita (i.e., private consumption per 
capita). This covers the market value of all goods and services, including durable 
14 
 
products (e.g., cars, washing machines, and home computers), purchased by 
households (World Bank, 2013); 
x Human Development Index (HDI) - this is a composite of life expectancy, education, 
and income indices intended to shift the focus of development from national income 
accounting to people-centred policies (United Nations Development Programme, 
2014). 
x Social Progress Index (SPI) ± this measures the extent to which countries provide for 
the social and environmental needs of their citizens. Fifty-two indicators in the areas 
of basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and opportunity show the relative 
performance of nations (Social Progress Imperative, 2014). 
To evaluate the validity of the neo-liberal explanation that higher levels of informal 
employment are the product of high taxes, corruption and state interference in the free 
market meanwhile, indicators previously used by Eurofound (2013) and the European 
Commission (2013) when assessing the assumptions of the neo-liberal perspective are 
used, namely the World Bank (2013) country-level indicators on: 
x Taxes on goods and services as a percentage of revenue, which includes general sales 
and turnover or value added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on 
services, taxes on the use of goods or property, taxes on extraction and production of 
minerals, and profits of fiscal monopolies; 
x Taxes on revenue (excluding grants) as a percentage of GDP. Revenue is cash 
receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, 
and income from property or sales. Grants are also considered as revenue but are 
excluded here. 
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x Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to 
the central government for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as 
fines, penalties, and most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and 
corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue. 
Meanwhile, the corruption assertion of the neo-liberal perspective is assessed using:  
x 7UDQVSDUHQF\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V &RUUXSWLRQ 3HUFHSWLRQV ,QGH[ &3, 7UDQVSDUHQF\
International 2013). This is a composite index of perceptions of public sector 
corruption that draws on 14 expert opinion surveys and scores nations on a 0-10 scale, 
with zero indicating high levels and 10 low levels of perceived public sector 
corruption; 
x The percentage of firms stating that they are expected to give gifts in meetings with 
tax officials, and  
x The percentage of firms giving informal payments to public officials. 
To evaluate both the neo-liberal explanation that state interference results in greater 
levels of informal employment, as well as the structuralist explanation that it is a product 
of inadequate levels of state intervention, the indicator used is that previously employed 
in reports by the European Commission (2013) and Eurofound (2013) when assessing the 
assumptions of the neo-liberal and structuralist perspectives, namely:  
x Social contributions as a % of revenue. Social contributions include social security 
contributions by employees, employers, and self-employed individuals, and other 
contributions whose source cannot be determined. They also include actual or 
imputed contributions to social insurance schemes operated by governments,  
x State revenue (excluding grants) as a % of GDP, and 
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x Expense of government as a % of GDP, which is a measure of the size of government 
and therefore a loose proxy of the degree of intervention. The expense of government 
is the level of cash payments for the operating activities of the government in 
providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages 
and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such 
as rent and dividends (World Bank, 2013). 
Meanwhile, and to analyse the structuralist thesis that informal employment is associated 
with the level of poverty, two indicators are analysed: 
x the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line (ILO, 2012), 
and 
x the size of the poverty gap at $1.25 per day in personal purchasing power standards. 
The poverty gap is here taken as the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting 
the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. 
This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence (World Bank, 
2013). 
To analyse the relationship between cross-national variations in the level of 
informal employment and these economic and social characteristics that each perspective 
contends are associated, and given the small sample size of just 41 countries for which 
data are available and lack of necessary controls to include in a multivariate regression 
analysis, it is only possible here to conduct bivariate regression analyses. Here, 
6SHDUPDQ¶V UDnk correlation coefficient (rs) is used due to the non-parametric nature of 
the data. As will become apparent, however, despite the limitation of only using bivariate 
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regression analysis, meaningful findings are produced with regard to the validity of the 
different theories.  
Below, therefore, firstly the variable level of informal employment across the 41 
less developed economies for which data are available will be reported and secondly, a 
preliminary analysis will be carried out of the wider economic and social conditions that 
each theory asserts are correlated with higher levels of informal employment in order to 
evaluate the competing theories. 
 
Findings: cross-national variations in the level of informal employment 
Examining the findings for the 41 countries for which data is available on the level of 
informal employment, Table 2 reveals that the simple unweighted average is that the 
majority (53.9 per cent) of non-agricultural workers in these less developed economies 
are in informal employment as their main job. However, and given the variable size of the 
workforce across countries, a weighted average figure is here employed that takes into 
account the variable size of the workforce in each country. The resultant finding is that 
across all 41 countries, just over one-third (34.4 per cent) of non-agricultural workers are 
in informal employment as their main job. Informal employment, therefore, is not some 
minor leftover of little importance. As the main occupation of over one in three of the 
non-agricultural workforce, this is a sizeable realm that employs a significant proportion 
of the labour force in these less developed economies. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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However, these figures for the 41 countries hide some marked variations across global 
regions. To analyse this, the 41 countries for which data are available are divided, using 
the World Bank (2013) classification into six regions, namely East Asia and the Pacific 
(China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam), Europe and Central Asia 
(Armenia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela), the Middle East and North Africa (Egypt and the West Bank and Gaza), 
South Asia (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and sub-Saharan Africa (Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  
Analysing the variations in informal employment across less developed 
economies in these global regions, the finding is that the weighted proportion of the non-
agricultural workforce in informal employment as their main job ranges from one in four 
(26.8 per cent) in Europe and Central Asia to over four out of five (82.6 per cent) in 
South Asia. The share of the working population in informal employment as their main 
job, therefore, is not evenly distributed across the globe.  
The variations between countries within each of these global regions, 
nevertheless, are as marked as the variations between global regions. As Table 3 displays, 
the proportion of the non-agricultural workforce that is in informal employment ranges 
from 83.6 per cent of the non-agricultural workforce in India to 6.1 per cent in Serbia. 
Indeed, in 24 (59 per cent) of the 41 nations, over half of the non-agricultural workforce 
is in informal employment. Informal employment, in consequence, is not some small 
segment of the economy of limited importance.   
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 also displays the proportion of informal employment in each country that is 
waged employment as opposed to own-account work conducted on a self-employed 
basis. This reveals importantly that that not all informal employment is waged work. 
Again, there are some marked variations across countries in the proportion of informal 
employment that is waged work, ranging from 89.9 per cent in Lesotho to 17.5 per cent in 
Liberia. On the whole, however, there is a statistically significant correlation between the 
proportion of the non-agricultural workforce which is in informal employment and the 
proportion of informal employment that is waged work. As Figure 1 reveals, the more 
informalised the economy, the more likely is informal employment to be waged work. 
,QGHHG XVLQJ 6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW Us) due to the non-parametric 
nature of the data, the finding is that the greater the degree of informalisation of a country 
measured in terms of the proportion of the non-agricultural workforce in informal 
employment, the greater is the proportion of the informal workforce in waged 
employment, and this is statistically significant within a 99 per cent confidence interval 
(rs= -.413**). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
   
How, therefore, can these cross-national variations in the level of informalisation across 
less developed economies be explained? Is there an association between the level of 
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informal employment and the various economic and social conditions in countries 
identified by the various theories earlier discussed? It is to this attention now turns.   
 
Analysis: evaluating the competing theories  
To explain the above cross-national variations in the level of informal employment, a 
preliminary analysis of the validity of each of the three theoretical perspectives is here 
conducted. Firstly, and to evaluate the validity of the modernisation perspective that the 
share of informal employment is lower in ³developed´ wealthier economies and greater 
in ³less developed´ economies, the correlation between such employment and GNP per 
capita is analysed across these 41 less developed economies. As Figure 2 reveals, and 
again XVLQJ6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQNFRUUHODWLRQ FRHIILFLHQW Gue to the nonparametric nature of 
the data, there is a strong significant relationship between the level of informal 
employment in a country and its GNP per capita (rs=-.560**). The direction of this 
relationship is that the share of the non-agricultural workforce in informal employment is 
higher in less developed economies with lower levels of GNP per capita. This is akin to 
previous findings (ILO, 2012; Yamada, 1996). Similar to this survey, nevertheless, these 
studies cannot establish the direction of the correlation in terms of any cause-effect 
relationship. This, in consequence, is a limitation of both the current as well as previous 
studies.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
21 
 
,Q UHFHQW \HDUV DOWHUQDWLYH LQGLFDWRUV RI WKH OHYHO RI µGHYHORSPHQW¶ KDYH emerged that 
take into account a wider range of variables other than simply economic productivity. 
Evaluating these other measures RI µGHYHORSPHQW¶ PRUH ZLGHO\ GHILQHG, the finding is 
that there is a strong significant correlation between cross-national variations in the level 
of employment and cross-national variations in not only household consumption 
expenditure per capita (rs= -.613**) but also the Human Development Index (rs= -.497**) 
and Social Progress Index (rs= -.509**). Informal employment therefore, by a range of 
LQGLFDWRUVRIµGHYHORSPHQW¶LVODUJHULQOHVVGHYHORSHGHFRQRPLHVWKXVFRQILUPLQJ+ 
To evaluate the neo-liberal perspective, whether the cross-national variations in 
the level of informal employment are correlated with taxes, corruption and state 
interference are analysed. Starting with the neo-liberal assertion that informal 
employment is higher when there is public sector corruption because this results in 
citizens exiting the formal economy so as to seek livelihoods beyond the corrupt public 
sector officials, the finding is that countries with higher perceived levels of public sector 
corruption have higher rates of informal employment (rs= -.564**). Some support is 
therefore found for this neo-liberal thesis in less developed economies. However, moving 
beyond perceptions and analysing whether citizens have encountered problems with 
corruption in practice, the finding is that there is no correlation between cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment and cross-national variations in either the 
share of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (rs= .224) or the 
percentage of firms making informal payments to public officials (rs= .066). No support 
is thus found that public sector corruption is in practice associated with the level of 
informal employment across these 41 less developed economies.  
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Is it valid therefore, that the level of informal HPSOR\PHQW LVDSURGXFWRIµH[LW¶
from the formal economy due to high taxes? Given that this is a core aspect of both neo-
liberal explanations as well as a key policy measure they advocate, several measures of 
taxation levels are here analysed. Beginning with the relationship between the cross-
national variations in the scale of informal employment and the level of taxes on goods 
and services as a percentage of revenue, the inverse of the neo-liberal suggestion is 
found. The scale of informal employment increases as taxes on goods and services 
decreases and this is a statistically significant correlation (rs= -.400**).  
This is similarly the case when two further measures of tax levels are analysed. 
There is a strong significantly correlation between cross-national variations in the level of 
revenue (excluding grants) as a share of GDP and the level of informal employment (rs=-
.626**). The levels of informal employment are significantly lower in countries where 
revenue is a higher proportion of GDP. Similarly, the same strong statistically significant 
relationship exists between the level of informal employment and cross-national 
variations in the level of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP (rs= -.637**). Again, 
informal employment is significantly lower in less developed economies where the level 
of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is higher.  
There is thus no evidence to support the neo-liberal argument that cross-national 
variations in the level of informal employment is associated with levels of public sector 
corruption practice and thus E\DGHVLUHWRµH[LW¶WKHIRUPDOHFRQRP\GXHWRSXEOLFVector 
corruption practices. There is also insufficient evidence to validate the neo-liberal thesis 
that higher tax rates result in exit from formal employment and a shift into informal 
employment. Instead, the inverse is the case; higher tax levels are correlated with lower 
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levels of informal employment, presumably since this provides greater state revenue for 
social transfers so that citizens can receive some level of social protection.  
To evaluate the validity of the neo-liberal argument that state interference in the 
operation of the market leads to higher levels of informal employment, as well as the 
contrary structuralist argument that the scale of informal employment reduces with 
greater state intervention, the relationship between cross-national variations in the scale 
of informal employment and both state revenue as a share of GDP as well as the expense 
of government as a share of GDP are analysed. The finding is that there is a steep decline 
in the scale of informal employment as both state revenue as a share of GDP increases 
(rs=-.605**) as well the expense of government as share of GDP (rs=-.555**). Bigger 
government leads to a decline, rather than increase, in the prevalence of informal 
employment. Similarly, when the level of social contributions as a percentage of revenue 
increases, there is a steep decline in the scale of informal employment. This is statistically 
significant (rs=-.560*). The neo-liberal assertion that state interference leads to greater 
informal employment is therefore refuted and instead, support found for the structuralist 
thesis that such employment is associated with too little state intervention in the form of 
social protection.  
The structuralist thesis that cross-national variations in informal employment are 
associated with the level of poverty is also supported. There is a strong statistically 
significant relationship between cross-national variations in the proportion of the 
population living below the national poverty line and the scale of informal employment. 
The greater is the share of the population living below the national poverty line in less 
developed economies, the higher is the scale of informal employment (rs=.396*). There is 
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also a strong statistically significant relationship between cross-national variations in the 
size of the poverty gap, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line of $1.25 per day in 
personal purchasing power standards, and cross-national variations in the scale of 
informal employment (rs=.692**). The intimation is that informal employment might 
well be a last resort turned to by marginalised groups with no other means of livelihood 
or support, as the structuralist perspective posits.   
  
Conclusions 
To explain the cross-national variations in the scale of informal employment, an 
exploratory analysis has been conducted of the validity of three competing theoretical 
perspectives in relation to less developed economies. These variously assert that higher 
levels of informal employment are correlated with economic under-development 
(modernisation theory), corruption, higher taxes and state interference (neo-liberal 
theory) and inadequate state intervention to protect workers from poverty (structuralist 
theory). Analysing data from direct surveys conducted in 41 less developed economies by 
the International Labour Organisation, the finding is that just over one in three (34.4 per 
cent) of the non-agricultural workforce participate in informal employment as their main 
job across these less developed economies, although there are marked cross-national 
variations, ranging from 83.6 per cent in India to 6.1 per cent in Serbia. Informal 
employment in consequence, is not some small segment of the labour market. In 59 per 
cent of the less developed economies surveyed, the majority of the non-agricultural 
workforce is engaged in informal employment. 
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Evaluating the competing explanations, the finding is that although the 
modernisation perspective tentatively appears to be valid that informal employment is 
associated with ³under-development´, none of the tenets of the neo-liberal thesis are 
validated. Instead, there is tentative support for the structuralist thesis that high taxes and 
social transfers are associated with lower levels of informal employment because these 
reduce the necessity to engage in such work in the absence of other means of support and 
livelihood. There is also support for the structuralist viewpoint that informal employment 
is closely associated with the level of poverty in less developed economies.  
The outcome is a call for a synthesis of the tenets of the modernisation and 
structuralist explanations. This finding in relation to less developed economies is similar 
to the earlier finding when seeking to explain cross-national variations across the 27 
member states of the European Union (Williams, 2013). The tentative intimation is that 
cross-national variations in the scale of informal employment across less developed 
economies can be explained using the same broad economic and social characteristics as 
cross-national variations in the more developed world of Europe. Put explicitly, lower 
levels of informal employment are associated with development and state intervention in 
the form of higher tax rates and social transfers to protect workers from poverty. This 
QHZ ³QHR-PRGHUQLVDWLRQ´ H[SODQDWLRQ QRW RQO\ DSSOLHV ZKHQ H[SODLQLQJ the cross-
national variations in informal employment in the developed world (Williams, 2013) but 
also, as shown in this paper, the developing world.  
To further evaluate the validity of this new neo-modernisation perspective, what 
is now required is to test whether similar findings result when using different measures of 
the scale of informal employment, such as indirect measurement methods (e.g., 
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Schneider, 2013) as well as when time-series data is examined for individual nations. 
Moreover, future studies need to analyse a wider range of indicators of state intervention 
to explore whether the findings hold for all types of state intervention or whether some 
types lead to a rise in the scale of informal employment. If a broader range of countries 
were analysed furthermore, multivariate regression analysis might also be used to 
determine how important each characteristic is to the final outcome whilst controlling for 
the other characteristics. This would then overcome a limitation of this paper which is 
based on just 41 less developed country cases and bivariate regressions. 
This relationship between informal employment and under-development, lower 
tax rates and inadequate state protection to protect workers from poverty moreover, has 
practical policy implications for governments. In stark contrast to the previous policy 
literature that has focused upon whether repressive measures need to be introduced and/or 
incentives to encourage formalisation (Eurofound, 2013; Feld and Larsen, 2012; OECD, 
2012), this paper has displayed that wider economic and social policies associated with 
the overarching modernisation of economies, state bureaucracies and social protection are 
also important. Put another way, it tentatively reveals that dealing with informal 
employment cannot be treated separately from wider economic and social policies.   
In sum, this paper has displayed that a sizeable share of the total workforce across 
these 41 countries are in informal employment as their main job and that marked cross-
national variations exist in the proportion in informal employment, which is associated 
with the level of development, tax rates, the size of government, level of social 
contributions and poverty rates. Given that such conclusions have to be cautious due to 
the limited data set and the sensitivity of the results in such cross-national comparisons, 
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this re-theorisation now needs to be tested longitudinally within nations and to a wider 
range of countries, using more refined multivariate regression analysis, so as to evaluate 
whether the relationship holds as well as which characteristics are most significantly 
correlated with informal employment. If this paper encourages such research as well as 
wider evaluation of the type of modernisation of economies and societies required, then it 
will have achieved its intention.  
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Table 1 The anatomy of informality  
Economic units Informal jobs Formal jobs 
Informal economic units A B 
Formal economic units C D 
Source: ILO (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Informal employment as % of total non-agricultural employment (unweighted 
and weighted) in less developed economies: by global region  
Global region % of non-agricultural 
workforce in informal 
employment, 
unweighted 
% of non-agricultural 
workforce in 
informal 
employment, 
weighted 
Number 
of 
countries 
East Asia & Pacific 44.1 44.0 5 
Europe and Central Asia 17.0 26.8 5 
Latin America & Caribbean 57.0 50.5 16 
Middle East & North Africa 54.9 51.5 2 
South Asia 74.7 82.6 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.4 53.2 10 
All global regions 53.9 34.4 41 
Source: derived from ILO (2012) 
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Table 3 Informal employment as share of non-agricultural employment, 41 less developed 
countries 
Country Year % of jobs in 
informal 
employment 
% of informal 
employment 
which is 
waged work 
Global region (World Bank 
classification) 
India 2009/10 83.6 52.8 South Asia 
Mali 2004 81.8 21.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Pakistan 2009/10 78.4 47.0 South Asia 
Tanzania 2005/6 76.2 26.8 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Bolivia 2006 75.1 46.4 Latin America & Caribbean 
Honduras 2009 73.9 39.8 Latin America & Caribbean 
Madagascar 2005 73.6 42.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Indonesia 2009 72.5 50.8 East Asia & Pacific 
Paraguay 2009 70.7 59.8 Latin America & Caribbean 
Philippines 2008 70.1 52.8 East Asia and Pacific 
Peru 2009 69.9 41.0 Latin America & Caribbean 
Zambia 2008 69.5 35.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Uganda 2010 69.4 34.8 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Vietnam 2009 68.2 40.2 East Asia & Pacific 
El Salvador 2009 66.4 42.4 Latin America & Caribbean 
Nicaragua 2009 65.7 41.6 Latin America & Caribbean 
Sri Lanka 2009 62.1 50.3 South Asia 
Ecuador 2009 60.9 52.5 Latin America & Caribbean 
Liberia 2010 60.0 17.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Colombia 2010 59.6 29.9 Latin America & Caribbean 
West Bank & 
Gaza 
2010 58.5 76.5 Middle East & North Africa 
Mexico 2009 53.7 55.6 Latin America & Caribbean 
Zimbabwe 2004 51.6 N.A. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Egypt 2009 51.2 N.A. Middle East & North Africa 
Argentina 2009 49.7 54.3 Latin America & Caribbean 
Dominican rep 2009 48.5 42.1 Latin America & Caribbean 
Venezuela 2009 47.5 34.3 Latin America & Caribbean 
Namibia 2008 43.9 73.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Panama 2009 43.8 39.7 Latin America & Caribbean 
Costa Rica 2009 43.8 43.9 Latin America & Caribbean 
Thailand 2010 42.3 N.A. East Asia & Pacific 
Brazil 2009 42.2 53.7 Latin America & Caribbean 
Uruguay 2009 39.8 34.3 Latin America & Caribbean 
Lesotho 2008 34.9 89.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa 2010 32.7 64.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 
China 2010 32.6 40.2 East Asia & Pacific 
Turkey 2009 30.6 N.A. Europe & Central Asia 
Armenia 2009 19.8 66.9 Europe & Central Asia 
Moldova Rep 2009 15.9 55.7 Europe & Central Asia 
Macedonia 2010 12.6 60.0 Europe & Central Asia 
Serbia 2010 6.1 53.4 Europe & Central Asia 
Source: derived from ILO (2012) 
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Figure 1 Relationship between level and nature of informal employment 
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Figure 2 Relationship between level of employment and GNP per capita 
